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Abstract 
We consider secret sharing schemes in which the dealer is able (after a preprocessing stage) 
to activate a particular access structure out of a given set and/or to allow the participants to 
reconstruct different secrets (in different time instants) by sending them the same broadcast 
message. In this paper we establish a formal setting to study secret sharing schemes of this 
kind. The security of the schemes presented is unconditional, since they are not based on any 
computational assumption. We give bounds on the size of the shares held by participants, on 
the size of the broadcast message, and on the randomness needed in such schemes. 
1. Introduction 
A secret sharing scheme is a method of dividing a secret s among a set 9 of 
participants in such a way that if the participants in A C 9’ are qualified to know the 
secret then by pooling together their information they can reconstruct the secret s; but 
any set A of participants not qualified to know s has absolutely no information on the 
secret. The collection of subsets of participants qualified to reconstruct the secret is 
usually referred to as the access structure of the secret sharing scheme. 
Secret sharing schemes are useful in any important action that requires the concur- 
rence of several designed people to be initiated, as launching a missile, opening a 
bank vault or even opening a safety deposit box. Secret sharing schemes are also used 
in management of cryptographic keys and multi-party secure protocols (see [ 171 for 
example). We refer the reader to the excellent survey papers [28,30] for a detailed 
discussion of secret sharing schemes and for a complete bibliography on the argument. 
Simmons [28] first pointed out the practical relevance of secret sharing schemes hav- 
ing the feature of being able (after some preprocessing stage) to activate a particular 
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access structure out of a given set and/or to allow the participants to reconstruct dif- 
ferent secrets (in different time instants) simply by sending to all partlclpants the same 
broadcast message. Ham et al. [18] gave an algorithm to construct (k,n, T) dynamic 
threshold secret sharing schemes (i.e., characterized by an access structure canslstmg 
of all subsets of participants of cardinality not less than some integer k), in which the 
dealer could enable participants to recover i” different secrets in different time Instants 
simply by sending the same broadcast message to all of them. However, the authors of 
[ I81 assumed that the access structure remained the same in each time instant. More- 
over, the security of the scheme decreases as the number of recovered secrets increases. 
Manm [2S] presented a technique to realize secret sharing schemes for general access 
structures in which, by sending a broadcast message to all participants, a new secret is 
activated and a participant is disenrolled from the scheme. Blakley et al. [2] considered 
the problem of constructing threshold secret sharing schemes with disenrollment capa- 
bllity, but the value of the threshold of the secret sharing schemes is not changed at 
each disenrollment. Moreover, they gave a lower bound on the size of the shares held 
by each participant in such schemes. Recently, Sun and Shieh [33] analyzed perfect 
(k, n, T) dynamic threshold schemes. They proved, in case that the secrets are uniformly 
chdsen, a lower bound on the size of the information each participant in the scheme 
holds and proposed an (M,H, T) dynamic threshold scheme meeting the bound. Blundo 
[3] pravided a simpler proof of the lower bound of [33] based on weaker assumptions. 
The problem of evaluating the size of the shares to be given to participants is 
among the most important problems in the area of secret sharing schemes. Recently, 
the problem of estimating the amount of random bits necessary to set: up the schemes 
has recetved considerable attention. The first problem IS stctctly related to the security 
of the schemes, smce the security of any system degrades as the amount of secret 
information increases. The probkm of estimating the number of random bits necessary 
to implement randomized algorithms is receiving considerable interest (see I 19,231, 
for example). This is due to the fact that the amount of randomness needed by an 
algorithm is to be considered a computational resource, analogous to the amount of 
trme and space needed. The quantitative study of the number of random bits needed 
by secret sharing schemes has been initiated in [7], where the opnmality of several 
secret sharing schemes according to this measure has been proved. Some other results 
on this topic can be found in [9]. 
In this paper we establish a formal setting to study secret sharing schemes in which 
different access structures and/or different secrets can be activated in subsequent time 
instants simply by sending the same broadcast message to all participants. Our approach 
is information-theoretic based. The security of the schemes presented in this paper is 
uncanditional, since they are not based on any computational assumption. We first study 
the case in which we have different access structures and we want to enable one of them 
to recanstruct a predefined secret. In this model we show that the size af shares held by 
any participant and the size of the broadcast message are bounded from below by the 
skze of the secret. We show that these bounds are optimal if one consrders separately the 
problem of bounding the size of the share of the participant and that of the broadcast 
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message (see Theorems 4.4 and 4.5). Motivated by this result we define Ideal Secret 
Sharing Schemes with Broadcast Message as schemes for which the size of the shares 
held by participants and the size of the broadcast messages are the same as the size of 
the secret. We analyze ideal secret sharing schemes with broadcast message when the 
family of the access structures that can be activated contains threshold access structures 
only. In Section 7 we consider the general case in which one wants to activate different 
access structures to recover possibly different secrets at subsequent time instants. We 
give sufficient conditions for the existence of a participant whose share size is lower 
bounded by the sum of the sizes of the secrets. This result generalizes the result of 
[2]. In Section 8 we analyze the randomness needed to set up secret sharing schemes 
with broadcast message and we give protocols that are optimal to this respect. 
2. Secret sharing 
A secret sharing scheme permits a secret to be shared among a set 9 of II participants 
in such a way that only qualified subsets of 9” can recover the secret, but any non- 
qualified subset has absolutely no information on the secret. An access structure d is 
the set of all subsets of 9 that can recover the secret. In this paper we require that 
any considered access structure d be monotone, that is if A E szl and A CA’ 2 9, 
then A’ E d. 
Let S be the set of secrets, {p~(s)},~s be a probability distribution on S, and let a 
secret sharing scheme C for secrets in S be fixed. For any participant P E 9, let us 
denote by K(P) the set of all possible shares given to participant P. Suppose a dealer D 
wants to share the secret s E S among the participants in 9 (we will assume that D $ 
9). He does this by giving each participant P E 9 a share from K(P) chosen according 
to some, not necessarily uniform, probability distribution. Given a set of participants 
A = {Pi,, . . . ,Pi, } C g, where il < i2 < . . . < i,, denote by K(A) K(Pi, ) x . . x K(P,, ). 
We represent, as in [32], a perfect secret sharing scheme, or simply a secret sharing 
scheme, C by a collection of distribution rules. A distribution rule is a function 
f:PU{D}+ u K(P)US 
PEP 
which satisfies the conditions f(D) E S and f(Pl) E K(Pj), for i = 1,2,. . . ,n. A 
distribution rule f represents a possible distribution of shares to the participants, where 
f(D) is the secret being shared, and f(Pi) is the share given to P,. If s E S is the 
value of the secret that D wants to share, then D will randomly choose a distribution 
rule f among all distribution rules having s as the secret, that is f E {f E F : f(D) = 
s}, according to some probability distribution, and use f to distribute shares to the 
participants. 
The family of distribution rules 9 can also be depicted as a matrix M, each row 
of which corresponds to one distribution rule. One column of M will be indexed by 
D, and the remaining columns are indexed by the members of 9. 
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Any secret sharing scheme for secrets in S and a probability distribution {p~(s)},,s 
naturally induce a probability distribution on K(A), for any A & 9. Denote such prob- 
ability distribution by {PK(A)(~)}~~K(A). To avoid overburdening the notation, with the 
same symbol A we will denote both a subset of participants and the random variable 
taking values in K(A) according to the probability distribution {PI((A)(~)}~~K(A); anal- 
ogously, with S we will denote both the set of secrets and the random variable taking 
values in S according to {p~(s)},,s. Finally, according to Eq. (A. 1) of Appendix 
H(S) = - Cps(s> log pds) 
SES 
is the entropy * of {p~(s)},~~ and 
H(A) = - c PK(A)(n) log PK(A)(U) 
QEK(A) 
is the entropy of {PI((A)(G)}~~K(~), for any A C 9’. 
Following the approach of [20,22,12] we define secret sharing schemes using the 
information measures listed in Appendix. Therefore, we say that a perfect secret sharing 
scheme, or simply a secret sharing scheme, is a sharing of the secrets in S among 
participants in 9 such that 
1. Any subset A C 9’ of participants enabled to recover the secret can compute the 
secret: Formally, for all A E &‘, it holds that H(S 1 A) = 0. 
2. Any subset A C 9’ of participants not enabled to recover the secret has no infbr- 
mation on the secret value: 
Formally, for all A +Z ~4, it holds that H(S 1 A) = H(S) 
3. Secret sharing schemes with broadcast message 
In this section we define secret sharing schemes with broadcast message. Let 9 = 
{PI,. . ,P,} be the set of participants. Let A = {&‘,, . . . , dm} be a family of mono- 
tone access structures on the set of participants 9 and let {p~(s)},~s be a probability 
distribution on the set of secrets S. The dealer in the preprocessing phase, knowing 
{p~(s)},~s (but not knowing the value of the secret) and A, generates and distributes 
shares to participants in 9. Afterward, in the message-generation phase, the dealer hav- 
ing as input a secret s randomly chosen accordingly to { ps(~)},~s, the access structures 
&I,..., &,, the shares of participants PI,. . . , P,, and an index i t { 1,2,. . . , m} (arbi- 
trarily chosen) computes a message bi and broadcasts it to all participants in 9. At the 
end of the message-generation phase, only the subsets of participants in di are able 
to recover s. These phases are described in the following algorithms. 
* For definition and properties of information-theoretic quantities that we will use in this paper see Appendix. 
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Preprocessing-Algorithm 
Input: S, { p~(s)},~~, 9’ = {PI,. . . , P,}, and ~21,. . , d,. 
Output: The shares al,. ,a, for participants PI,. , P,, respectively. 
Message-Generation 
Input: s E S, did], . . . , d,,,, al ,..., a,, and i E {1,2 ,..., m}. 
Output: The broadcast message bi that enables the access structure &‘i. 
As we will see in Theorem 3.2, a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message 
C secure for a fixed probability distribution on the set of secrets S is secure for any 
probability distribution on S. Therefore, in the previous algorithms we could omit the 
probability distribution {p~(s)},~s as input. It is enough to give as input, instead of S 
and {ps(s)},,s, only the set of secrets chosen with non-zero probability. 
In this section we consider the case in which we want to enable once for all only one 
access structure among the family A. The case in which we want to enable different 
access structures at different times will be analyzed in Section 7. 
If d is an access structure on 9, then B E d is a minimal authorized subset if 
A 6 d whenever A c B. The set of minimal authorized subsets of & is denoted J@ 
and is called the basis of d. The access structure & is uniquely determined as a 
function of do, since we have d = {B C: 9 : A C B, A E do}. We say that d is the 
closure of do and write d = cl(d’). 
Let A = {&‘I,..., d, 1 dj C 2,Y, 1 d id m} be a family of distinct access structures 
on 9’. For 1 <j d m, let 9”j = lJXE.d,j X. We will refer to a participant P E 9 as an 
essentiul participant if there exist a set X C P and an index i such that X U {P} E 
dp. If a participant P is not essential then we can construct a secret sharing scheme 
with broadcast message giving him nothing as share. In this paper we assume that 
the set of participants 9’ consists only of essential participants. We assume that the 
considered access structures are not trivial, that is, there is always at least a subset 
of participants who can reconstruct the secret, i.e., d # 0, and that not all possible 
subsets of participants are able to recover the secret, i.e., 8 6 d. Moreover, we suppose 
that the family of access structures A is different from the trivial one, i.e., A does not 
contain a unique access structure with basis the family {{PI }, . . . , {P,}}. Indeed, to 
realize a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for such an access structure, 
the dealer hands out to participants nothing as share and, in the Message-Generation 
phase, he distributes the secret itself as broadcast message. 
Let S be the set of secrets, {p~(s)},~s be a probability distribution on S, and let a 
secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for secrets in S be fixed. Analogously to 
the case of secret sharing scheme without broadcast message, for any participant P E 8, 
we denote by K(P) the set of all possible shares given to participant P. Given a set of 
participants A = {Pi,, . . ,Pi,-} C 9, where ir < i2 < . < i,, denote with K(A) the set 
K(Pj, ) x . . . x K(Pig ). A secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for secrets in S 
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and a probability distribution {ps(s)},,s induce a probability distribution on K(A), for 
any A C 9. Denote such a probability distribution by {PK(A)(Q)}~~K(A). Finally, denote 
by H(S) the entropy of {PS(S)},G and by H(A) the entropy of {PK(A)(Q)}~EK(A), for 
any A C 9. 
For any access structure di E A, let us denote by b, a generic broadcast message that 
enables the access structure &i and by F(Bi) the set of all possible broadcast messages 
enabling &‘i. A secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A = {&‘I,. . . , dm} 
and a probability distribution {p~(s)},,~ induce, through the two probabilistic algo- 
rithms above, a probability distribution on each &(Bi). Denote such a probability dis- 
tribution by {pG(B,)(b)}bEB(B,). To avoid overburdening the notation, with the same 
symbol Bi we will denote both the set of all possible broadcast messages enabling &, 
and the random variable taking values in &(&) according to the probability distribution 
{P6(&))hEW(s,). 
By using the entropy approach, as done in [20,22, 12,4,5,7-9, 13, 15,341 for usual 
secret sharing schemes, we define a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message as 
follows. 
Definition 3.1. Let A = {&I,. . ,d,,,} be a family of access structures on ?. A 
secret sharing scheme with broadcast message is a distribution of secrets in S among 
participants in B such that 
1. Before knowing the broadcast message any subset of participants has no information 
about the value of the secret: Formally 
for any X 5 9, it holds that H(SJX) = H(S). 
2. After all participants have received the broadcast message, we have a secret sharing 
scheme for the access structure ._&pei: Formally, for any di E A and for any X C 8, 
it holds that 
H(S) if X 6 di, 
H(SIXBj) = 
0 if X E 1;9,. 
Notice that the condition H(SIX) = H(S) is equivalent to stating that S and X are 
statistically independent, i.e., for all x E K(X) and for all s E S, it results p(s(x) = 
ps(s) and therefore the knowledge of x gives no information about the secret. Equiva- 
lently, the condition H(SIXBi) = H(S) means that S and XBi are statistically indepen- 
dent. Moreover, the condition H(SIXBi) = 0 means that each set of values of the shares 
and broadcast message in K(X) x 6(Bi) corresponds to a unique value of the secret. 
In fact, by definition, H(SIXBi) = 0 is equivalent to the fact that for all x E K(X) and 
for all b E 8(Bi) with p(x, b) > 0 a unique s E S exists such that p(sIx b) = 1. 
Notice that, Property 1 of Definition 3.1 can be equivalently stated as H(S(Pt . . . P,) 
= H(S). 
A secret sharing scheme C with broadcast message for the family A = {&I,. , d,} 
of access structures on the set of participants CY = {PI,. . , P,,} with secrets chosen in 
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S, can be also formalized as a tuple 
(K(PI),...,K(P,),d(BI),...,&(B,),d, {K I,._  ,a,,,i,s {(a, ,..., a,,)EK(P, )x---xK(P,,),I <i<tn,.GS} 1 > ) 
where K(Pi ), . . . , K(P,) are the sets of possible shares for participants Pi,. . . , P,, re- 
spectively, the set b(Bi), i = 1,. . , m, contains all possible broadcast messages enabling 
the ith access structure, A is a probability distribution on K(Pr ) x . . . x K(P,), and 
inO, ,... a,,.r,s]{(a~ . . . . . u,,)EK(Pl)x...xK(P,,),l <i<m.sES} is a family of conditional probability dis- 
tributions on the set of broadcast messages given the shares distributed to participants, 
the access structure to be enabled and the secret to be shared, that is, for fixed val- 
ues al,. . .,a,, i, and s, we have that Il, ,,,,,, a,,,i,s = {Pr(B; = blPl = al,.. .,P, = a,,, 
S = s)}bER(B,). 
Let Y be a random variable taking values on gy, with support(Y) we denote the 
set of values of OGJ with positive probability, that is, support(Y) = {y E ?I : Pr( Y = 
y) > O}. We claim (see Theorem 3.2) that the scheme C is also a secret sharing 
scheme with broadcast message for secrets chosen in S’, where S’ is any random 
variable defined on support(S). For any X C 9 and for i = 1,. . . , m let X’ and B( be 
random variables defined on the shares given to participants in X and on the broadcast 
message, respectively, when the secrets are chosen in S’. It is easy to see that for any 
XC g it holds that H(X) = H(X’) and that H(S’lX’) = H(S’). Moreover, by using 
the same arguments employed in [8], we can easily prove that H(S’IX’B:) = 0, for 
X E d;, H(S’IX’Bi) = H(S’), for X $ di, and Pr(Bi = b) = Pr(B: = b), for i = 
I,. . ,m and for any b E E(Bi). Hence, for i = 1,. . . ,112, it holds that H(Bi) = H(B:). 
We conclude that if a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message C is secure for a 
fixed probability distribution on the set of secrets S, then it is secure for any probability 
distribution defined on its support. This result has important consequences. Indeed, we 
will prove in Theorem 4.2 that the entropy of any participant P E 9 and the entropy 
of any broadcast message Bi must be at least log ISI. 
Therefore, we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.2. Let A = {dr ,..., dm} be a family of access structures on a set 9 
of participants. If C is a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A with 
secrets chosen in S, then C is a secret sharing scheme for A with secrets chosen in S’, 
where S’ is any random variable defined on support(S). Moreover, for i = 1,. . , m 
and for any XC 8, it holds that H(X) = H(X’) and H(B,) = H(Bi), where X’ is 
the random variable induced by C on the shares given to participants in X and Bi 
is the random variable induced by C on the broadcast message when the secrets are 
chosen in S’. 
Theorem 3.2 states that a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message C secure 
for a fixed probability distribution on the set of secrets S is secure for any probability 
distribution on S. Hence, all the schemes presented in this paper that are realized 
assuming the uniform probability on the set secrets with support Z, with q 22, are 
secure against any probability distribution on Z,. 
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As an example of a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message let us consider 
the following situation. Let B = {Pi, P2, . . . , Pe} be the set of participants. Suppose 
the family A contains three access structures -021 = cl({{P~, Pz}, {Pz,P3}}), ._G+ = 
cI({{P~,P~}}), and &‘s = cl({{P~,Ps}, (P5,Ph))). The family of all bases is depicted 
in Fig. 1. The following algorithms realize a secret sharing scheme with broadcast 
message for A when the secret is uniformly chosen in Z,, with U, we denote the 
uniform probability distribution on Z,. 
Preprocessing-Algorithm 
[nput: Z,, U,, 9’ = {PI,. . . ,PG}, and 61,&z, &s. 
Randomly select ri , r-2, t-3, r4, rg, t-6 E Z,. 
Let al = t-1 be the share of participant PI, a2 = r2 be the share of participant P2, 
a3 = (rl,r3) be the share of participant P3, a4 = (r4,rs) be the share 
of participant P4, 
a5 = r6 be the share of participant Ps, and a6 = t-5 be the share of 
participant Pg. 
Output: The shares al,. . . , a6 for participants PI,. . . , Pg, respectively. 
Message-Generation 
Input:sEZ,, ~zIa,,&‘s,,~Z~,al,..., ab,andi~{1,2,3}. 
Let al = q, a2 = i-2, a3 = (f-1, q), a4 = (rd,rg), a5 = rg, and a6 = r5. 
Compute xi = t-1 + r2 mod q, x2 = r3 + r4 mod q, and x3 = t-5 + r6 mod q. 
Output: The broadcast message bi = s + xi mod q that enables the access 
structure d,. 
It is easy to see that previous algorithms realize a secret sharing scheme with broadcast 
for A. 
4. The size of shares 
The problem of establishing bounds on the size of the shares to be given to par- 
ticipants in secret sharing schemes is one of the basic problem in the area and has 
received considerable attention by several researchers [lo-12,5,6,8,3 1,32, 13,34,4]. 
The practical relevance of this issue is based on the following observations: Firstly, 
the security of any system tends to degrade as the amount of information that must 
be kept secret, i.e., the shares of the participants, increases. Secondly, if the shares 
given to participants are too long, the memory requirements for the participants will 
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be too severe and, at the same time, the share distribution algorithms will become 
inefficient. Therefore, one important problem is to analyze the amount of informa- 
tion that each participant must keep secret. We will prove a basic bound stating 
that in any secret sharing scheme with broadcast message the size of the shares, as 
well as the size of the broadcast message, cannot be less than the size of the se- 
cret. 3 Moreover, there are families of access structures for which any correspond- 
ing secret sharing scheme with broadcast message must either give to some par- 
ticipant a share of size strictly bigger than the secret size, or the broadcast 
message has to have size strictly bigger than that of the secret, as we will see in 
Section 6. 
For any access structure di E A, let us denote by &‘B the family &‘f = {X u 
{Bi}lX E di}, that is, G?; contains all the sets in the access structure di that can 
reconstruct the secret together with the broadcast message that enables &i. Intuitively, 
in ~26 the broadcast message Bi “plays” the role of a participant. 
The following lemmas and theorems are a generalization to secret sharing schemes 
with broadcast message of the results proved in [12] for secret sharing schemes with 
no broadcast message. 
Lemma 4.1. Let A = {JZ!, ,..., JzZ~} b e a family of access structures on a set 9 of 
pmticipants. Let i E { 1,. . . , m}, if Y E 2 ,(pu{BJ}\~$f7 und X U Y E df, then H(XI Y) = 
H(S) + H(XJ YS). 
Proof. Let Y E 2~““{Bt)\d~, we distinguish two cases: Bi $ Y and Bi E Y. If Bi @ Y, 
then H(SIY) = N(S) by Property 1 of Definition 3.1. If Bi E Y, then H(S]Y) = 
H(S) because of Property 2 of Definition 3.1 since Y\{Bi} $ d;. Now, consider 
3 As is customary, we measure both the size of the shares and the size of the broadcast message by the 
logarithm of the size of the sets from which they are taken, that is, by the number of bits necessary to their 
representation. 
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the conditional mutual information Z(X; Sly), that can be written either as H(XI Y) - 
H(XlYS) or as H(SIY) -H(SIXY). Hence, H(XJY) = H(X(YS)+H(SIY) -H(S(XY). 
Because of H(SIXY) = 0 for X U Y E &‘B and H(SJY) = H(S), we have H(XIY) = 
H(S) + H(XI YS). q 
We recall that throughout this paper we assume that all secrets are chosen in the 
sample space with non-zero probability. Next theorem holds. 
Theorem 4.2. Let A = {a, ,..., d,,,} be a family of’ access structures on a set B of 
participants. For any secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A: 
1. For any participant P E p, it holds that H(P)> log /SJ. 
2. For i = 1,2,. . , m, it holds that H(Bi)> log ISI. 
Proof. An immediate consequence of Lemma 4.1 and Property (A.4) of Appendix is 
that for any secret sharing scheme with broadcast messages for A, for any participant 
P E 9 and for i = 1,2,. . . , m, it holds that H(P) > H(S) and H(Bi) 3 H(S). Let Z be 
a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A with secret chosen in S. From 
Theorem 3.2 we have that C is also a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message 
for any probability distribution, in particular for the uniform one, and that, for any 
P E 9 and i = 1, , m, it holds that H(P) = H(P’) and H(Bi) = H(Bi). Hence, 
we can conclude that for any participant P E 9 and for i = 1,2,. . . , m, it holds that 
H(P)3 log (SI and H(B,)> log (SI which prove the theorem. 0 
Next lemma implies that the uncertainty on shares of participants in X $ &i cannot 
be decreased by the knowledge of the secret. 
Lemma 4.3. Let A = {&I,. . . , dm} be a jhmily of access structures on a set 9 of 
participants. Let i E { 1,. . . , m}, ifX U Y E 2, ‘IpufB’}\&r, then H(YIX) = H(YIXS). 
Proof. The conditional mutual information I( Y, SIX) can be written either as H( Y IX)- 
H(YIXS) or as H(SIX)-H(SIXY). Hence, H(YIX) = H(YlXS)+H(SIX)-H(S(XY). 
Since X U Y $ df we have H(SIAY) = H(SIX)=H(S). Hence, H(YIX) = H( Y/AT). 
0 
Next theorems prove that the bounds given in Theorem 4.2 are optimal if considered 
separately. More preciseIy, we will prove that for any family of access structures there 
exist secret sharing schemes with broadcast message such that the size of the shares 
given to a predefined participant or the size of the broadcast messages is the same as 
that of the secret. 
The secret sharing schemes with broadcast message presented in this section are all 
realized by considering uniform distributions on S = Z,, where q 22. 
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Theorem 4.4. Let A = {&I,..., al,,,} be a family of access structures on a set of 
participants 9 and let P E 9 be a jixed participant. For any set of secrets S, there 
exists a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message such that the entropy of the 
shares given to participant P satisjes 
H(P) = log /S(. 
Proof. We describe a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message that satisfies the 
property above for a participant Pk E 9 when the secret is uniformly chosen in S. 
Preprocessing-Algorithm 
Input: Z,, U,, 9 = {Pi,. . .,P,}, Pk E 9, and ~41,. . ,d, 
Randomly select r E Z,. 
Let ak = r be the share of Pk. 
For 1 <i <m, for any Y E di, and for any Pj E Y\{Pk} randomly select 
Yi.Y,J E Z,. 
For all Pj E p\{Pk} Compute 
aJ = 6 U {Yi,Y,jl. 
I=1 Y&c&) 
Output: The shares at,. . ,a, for participants PI,. . . , P,,, respectively. 
Message-Generation 
Input: s ES = Z,, Pk E 9, &I,..., d,, al ,..., a,, and i E {1,2 ,..., m}. 
For 1 <i<m, set yi,Y,k = ak if& E Y and Y E &f. 
For the access structure di compute 
bi= U{ s-t C Yg,jmodq . 
YWY j:P,EY > 
Output: The broadcast message bi enabling the access structures LA,. 
1 
It is not difficult to see that the previous protocol realizes a secret sharing scheme with 
broadcast message. Indeed, before knowing the broadcast message any subset of partic- 
ipants has no information about the value of the secret; once the dealer distributes the 
broadcast message bi only the participants in Y E ~2’: can recover the secret s. Given the 
broadcast message bi, the participants in Y E ~40 can first obtain s-t CP,EY y i,r,, mod q. 
From the preprocessing phase they can compute CP,EY y,,yJ mod q from which they 
get the secret s E S. 0 
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In Section 3 we presented a scheme for the family of access structures A = 
ticipants 9 = {Pi,. . . , P6). In such a scheme participants P3 and P4 get a share whose 
size is twice the size of the secret. By using the algorithms presented in the previous 
theorem either P3 or P4 can have a share of the same size as that of the secret. A 
possible scheme in which P3 gets a share whose size is equal to the size of the secret 
is the following. 
Preprocessing-Algorithm 
Input: Z,, U,, B = {PI,, . ,Pe}, and -C41,&‘2,&‘3. 
Randomly select ~1, r-2,. . . , rg E Z,. 
Let ai = rl be the share of participant PI, ~22 = (r2, r3) be the share of 
participant P2, 
~3 = r-4 be the share of participant P3, ~24 = (rs,rg) be the share of 
participant P4, 
as = (rT,rg) be the share of participant Pg, and &j = r-9 be the share of 
participant Pg. 
Output: The shares al,. . , a6 for participants PI,. . , P6, respectively. 
J 
Message-Generation 
IUpUt:sES=Z,,~pal,d2,,ae3,al,..., @j,andiE{l,2,3}. 
Let ui = f-1, u2 = (be), a3 = i-4, u4 = (%r6), u5 = (r,,rg), and 626 = rg. 
Compute by = (s + YI + r2 mod q, s + r3 + t-4 mod q), 
b2 = s + r-4 + r5 mod q, and 
b3 = (65 + r-7 mod q, s + rg + r-9 mod q). 
Output: The broadcast message bi enabling the access structure di. 
It is easy to see that previous algorithms realize a secret sharing scheme with broadcast 
for A in which the participant P3 gets a shares whose size is equal to the size of the 
secret. 
Next theorem proves that for any family of access structures there exists a secret 
sharing scheme with broadcast message such that the size of the broadcast messages 
is the same as that of the secret. 
Theorem 4.5. Let A = (~21,. .., dm} be a family of access structures on a set of 
participants 9. For any set of secrets S, there exists a secret sharing scheme with 
broadcast message such that, for all j E (1,2,. , m), the entropy of Bj satisfies 
H(Bj) = log 1st. 
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Proof. We describe a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message that satisfies the 
property above when the secret is uniformly chosen in S. For each j = 1,2,. . , m, let 
Cj be a secret sharing scheme for the access structure -02J- for secrets chosen in Z,. 
Preprocessing-Algorithm 
Input: Z,, U,, 9 = {PI, . . . , P,,}, and di , . . . , d,. 
Randomly select x1 ,x2, . . . ,x, E Z,. 
For each access structure &i, with i = 1,2,. . , m, let y,,j be the share given to 
the participant Pj E pi, when we share the value x; by using the scheme C,. 
For all Pj E 9’ compute 
uj = U {Vl,j). l:P,E.‘P, 
Output: The shares al,. , a, for participants PI,. . . , P,,, respectively. 
Message-Generation 
Input: s ES = Z,, &‘I,..., drn, al ,..., a,, and i E {1,2 ,..., m}. 
Let Uj = IJ {_Yi,j}, for j= 1,2 ,..., Iz. 
i : P,E.Y, 
Let xi be secret corresponding to the shares yi,l, yi,2, . . , yi,n in the scheme C;. 
Let bi = s + xi mod 4. 
Output: The broadcast message bi that enables the access structure d,. 
It is not difficult to see that the previous protocols realize a secret sharing scheme 
with broadcast message. Moreover, in the previous protocols we have that H(Bj) = 
log ISI, where j = 1,2,. . . ,m. 0 
5. Ideal schemes 
In the previous section we have seen that for any family of access structures A either 
the share given to a participant in 9, or the broadcast message can be of the same 
size as that of the secret. In this section we give a sufficient condition for there to 
exist a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for a family of access structures 
A = {&‘I,..., d,}suchthatforanyP~~andforanyi~{1,2,...,m},itholdsthat 
H(P) = H(B,) = log ISI. That is, we consider schemes in which both the broadcast 
messages and the shares of participants have the same size as that of the secret. From 
Theorem 4.2 it turns out that we get an optimal situation when H(P) = H(B) = log (SI, 
for any participant P and broadcast message B, hence we define ideal secret sharing 
schemes with broadcast message as follows. 
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Definition 5.1. Let A = {&‘I ,..., dm} be a family of access structures on a set 9 of 
participants. A secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A is said to be ideal 
if for any P E 9 and for any i E { 1,2,. . . ,m}, we have H(P) = H(Bi) = log ISI. 
Using the results in [15] and the arguments employed to prove Theorem 3.2, we can 
show that previous definition of ideal schemes is equivalent to defining ideal secret 
sharing schemes as schemes in which for any P E 3 and for any i E { 1,2,. . . , m}, it 
results that (support(P)1 = Isupport(Bi)l = /SI. Th’ is implies that the shares and the 
broadcast messages are uniformly chosen (see [ 151). 
We first consider the simple case A = {dl} for the analysis of ideal schemes with 
broadcast message. We recall that a secret sharing scheme for an access structure JX? is 
ideal if for any P E 9 it results that Isupport(P)I = ISI. This implies that the shares 
given to participants are uniformly chosen. 
Theorem 5.2. Assume that the secret is chosen in S = Z,, q 22. An ideal secret 
sharing scheme with broadcast message for A = {&I}, where S = Z,, exists if and 
only if there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme for the access structure &I, where 
s = z,. 
Proof. Suppose that there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme C with broadcast mes- 
sage for A. Given a non-zero probability broadcast message b E I, consider the 
following scheme Ch for di when the probability distribution on S is uniform. For 
any possible broadcast message b consider the scheme Cb obtained by considering 
only the distribution rules dealing with b as broadcast message. In the scheme Cb the 
dealer hands out to the participants of di the same shares as he would distribute in 
C conditioned on the fact that the broadcast message is b. The scheme Cb is a se- 
cret sharing scheme for ~~21, in fact since b is a broadcast message, if X $! di then 
H(S]X) = H(S) and if X E &i then H(SIX) = 0. It is immediate to see that for any 
value b the secret sharing scheme Cb is ideal. Suppose, on the other hand, that an ideal 
secret sharing scheme I’, with secrets in Z,, for ~~21 exists. Then, use it to distribute 
among the participants in 9 a value x randomly chosen in Z,. The broadcast message 
will be bl = s +x mod q. The shares of participants in the scheme for A will be the 
shares distributed to participants by using the ideal scheme C’. Clearly this is an ideal 
secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A. 0 
Therefore, the classification of ideal secret sharing schemes with no broadcast mes- 
sage given in [lo] applies also to secret sharing schemes with broadcast message 
consisting of a single access structure. 
In the general case A = {&I,..., &,}, it is easy to see that for an ideal secret 
sharing scheme with broadcast message to exist each access structure must admit an 
ideal secret sharing scheme. This condition is necessary but not sufficient as we will 
see in Section 6. 
Recall that, for 1 <j dm, 9j = UXE,ploX. 
i 
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Definition 5.3. Two access structures &, and &‘2, on the sets of participants 9, and 
9’2, respectively, are compatible if and only if 
Let ..&I and &‘2 be two access structures on the sets of participants 9’1 and 92, 
respectively. If 9, n 9p2 # 0 we say that the two access structures are connected. 
Suppose that JJ~ and J& are not connected. To see that if dl and d2 are not 
connected then there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for 
A = {&1,&2}, we distinguish three cases. If 81 # cl({{Pi} : Pi E 91)) and &2 # 
Ci({{Pi} : Pi E S,}), then there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast 
message for A = {~!i,.&‘2}, where S = Z,, if and only if there exists an ideal secret 
sharing scheme with broadcast message for both Ai = {&I} and A2 = {&z}, where 
S = Z,. If A%‘) = cl({{P,} : Pi E 9,)) and .& # cl({{P;} : P, E ?p2}), then it is 
easy to see that there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message 
for A = {&r,&2}, where S = Z,, if and only if there exists an ideal secret sharing 
scheme with broadcast message for A2 = {&}, where S = Z,. (To the participants 
P, E 9, the dealer distributes a randomly chosen value x E Z,, and when he wants to 
share a secret s he distributes the broadcast message x + s mod q.) Finally, if JX!, = 
Cl({{Pj} 1 P, E Y]}), d2 = Cl({{Pi} 1 Pi E 93)2}), and .dl # &‘2, then there exists an 
ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A = {&!I, &2}, where S = Z,. 
We say that m access structures d 1,. , r.d’m are connected if the set U~z,9pi cannot 
be partitioned into two non-empty sets X and Y such that each yi, for i = 1,. . . , m, 
is contained either in X or in Y. When .di, . , d, are not connected, we can study 
separately each connected part. 
The following lemma, due to Brickell and Davenport [lo] (see also [ 1.51) holds for 
any ideal secret sharing scheme. We will use it in the next theorem. 
Lemma 5.4. Let .d be an access structure. if there exists an ideal secret sharing 
scheme for ~4, then for any A E do, the set K(A) of possible shares for A has 
cardinality IK(A)( = (SIIAI. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that for ideal secret sharing schemes the shares 
and the secret are chosen in the same set. The following corollary is an immediate 
consequence of previous lemma. 
Corollary 5.5. Let d be an access structure. Suppose there exists an ideal secret 
sharing scheme for -c9, where S = Z,. Then, for any Y C X, w*here X E <do, the set 
K(Y) of the possible shares for Y is K(Y) = Zrl. 
Theorem 5.6. Let A = {_dl ,..., ,Plm} be a family of m pairwise compatible connected 
access structures. Suppose that, for each di, with i = 1,. ,112, there exists an ideal 
secret sharing scheme with broadcast message where S = Z,, q 3 2. Then, there exists 
an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A where S = Z,. 
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Proof. Consider an access structure 1;p on the set of participants 9’ and suppose that 
there exists an ideal scheme C, represented by a family of distribution rules 8, when 
the secrets and the shares are chosen in Z,. If we randomly choose the shares of 
the participants in I = &,E,dO X, so that the participant P E I receives the share yp, 
then, from Corollary 5.5 there exists at least one distribution rule f E F such that 
f(P) = yp, for P E I. The following Preprocessing-Algorithm is based on the previous 
observation. Hence, we randomly choose the share of any participant belonging to at 
least two access structures in A (remember that the access structures in A are pairwise 
compatible), then we distribute the shares to the remaining participants according to 
the distribution rules that agree on the shares previously distributed. The Message- 
Generation algorithm is realized accordingly. The algorithms realizing a secret sharing 
scheme with broadcast message for A, with secrets in Z,, are the following. 
Preprocessing-Algorithm 
Input: S =Z,, U,, {Pl,Pz,. ,P,,}, and di,. . ,d,. 
Let, w.l.o.g., PI ,..., P, be all participants in at least two access structures in A. 
For 1 <j <m, let Cj be an ideal secret sharing scheme for the access structure 
&j represented by the family of distribution rules 9j. 
For j = l,...,~ 
Randomly select r; E Z,. 
Let a, = rj be the share of participant Pi. 
For j = l,...,m 
if 9; g{Pl,...,P,} then 
Randomly choose f f 9, such that f(Pi) = Y,, for all P, E Yj 
and ldidr. 
Let Xj = f(D). 
For all Pi E gj\{Pl,. . . , P,}, let aj = f(Pi). 
Output: the shares al,. ,a, for participants PI,. , P,, respectively. 
Message-Generation 
Input: s E S = Z,, d\ ,..., d,, al ,..., a,, xl ,..., xmr {PI ,..., P,}, 
and i E {1,2 ,..., m}. 
For j = l,...,m 
If 9jC{Pl,...,P,} then 
Let bj = s + CPiE,+, ak mod q be the broadcast message for &j E A. 
else 
Let b, = s + xj mod q be the broadcast message for &j E A. 
Output: The broadcast message bi that enables the access structures ,r4i. 
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These algorithms realize an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for 
A. In fact, if 9j C_{Pt ,..., Pl}, then the access structure L&Y consists of only one 
set Y = 9j. Indeed, each P E 9j is in at least two access structure in A and by 
Definition 5.3 it follows that P E &E,d~ X. Therefore &y contains only the set 9j. 
The participants in LPj summing up their’ shares can obtain the value cP, E,IP ffk mod 
q and from bj = s + CPaE,,, ak mod q they can compute the value s. Whereas, if 
.+ e{Pl, . , P,.}, then the participants in any Y E _d, can compute Xj from their 
shares. Since the participants in Y know b, = s + X, mod q, they can get s E S. 
Moreover, both the size of the shares given to participants and the size of the broadcast 
messages are the same as the size of the secret. 0 
6. Threshold schemes with broadcast message 
In this section we analyze the case in which all access structures in A are distinct 
threshold structures, that is, A = { d(k,,!~, ), d(k2,.‘Pz), . . . , dtk,,~,)}, where &‘(k,,p, 1 is the 
set of all subsets consisting of at least /?j participants in pi, i.e., d(k,,,?p,) = {x c .?i : 
IX 12 ki}. In the previous section we have seen that if there exists an ideal secret sharing 
scheme with broadcast message for a family A of access structure, then any access 
structure in A admits an ideal secret sharing scheme. The converse is not always true. 
In fact, threshold schemes that admit ideal secret sharing schemes do not always have 
ideal secret sharing schemes with broadcast message as we will see in the following. 
If t = 1, then by Theorem 5.2 and [26] there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme 
with broadcast message for A. We observe that for a threshold structure dck,,.~,) a 
participant P belongs to nXE.dO 
(A,. +“, I 
X if and only if /c; = IPpi], that is Id&,9,:,l = 1. 
Thus, two connected access structures zZ~~,,.~,) and .G!~~~,_P~) are compatible if and only 
if 9’1 n 9’2 = 0 or both conditions kl = 19’11 and k2 = 1321 are satisfied. 
From Theorem 5.6 we know that if the access structures in A = {&(k,,./P,),&(kl,f12) 
&tk,,,y,)} >‘..>’ are pairwise compatible, then there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme 
with broadcast message for A. The following theorem establishes that if there exists 
an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for the family A of threshold 
structures, then the access structures in A are pairwise compatible. Moreover, if an 
ideal scheme for A does not exist, then the following theorem proves a gap for the 
dimension of the shares of participants and of the broadcast message. Either there is 
an ideal scheme or the size of at least one of them is 50% bigger than the secret size. 
To prove Theorem 6.2 we will use the following lemma that is a slight extension of 
Theorem 4.1 proved in [12] We omit the proof since it is similar to that given in [12]. 
Lemma 6.1. Let A, B, C, D, F, S be six random variables such that 
1. H(SIABF) = H(SIBCF) = H(SIACDF) = 0, 
2. H(SIBF) = H(S[ACF) = H(SIADF) = H(SIF). 
Then H(BCIF) >3H(S\F). 
Next theorem holds. 
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Theorem 6.2. Let A = {dck, ,.?p, ) JzZ+,.~~ ), . . . , dck,,.?p,)} be a family of t 2 2 distinct 
connected access structures. If an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message 
for A exists then, the access structures in A are pairwise compatible. 
If an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message does not exist them, 
for each participant P E Bi, n 9il there is an index j E { 1,2}, such that for 
an_y secret sharing scheme with broadcast message it holds that H(P) + H(B,,) 
33 log (SI. 
Proof. We first consider the case t = 2. If dt and &‘z are compatible, then there 
exists an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A from Theorem 5.6. 
Suppose now that dt and ~42 are not compatible. Let Y = 19~1 f 9~j and let tl = lP,j 
and t2 = 19’21. Notice that r is always greater than zero since the access structures are 
connected. We distinguish two cases: 
Case a. k, < r or kz < r. 
Case b. k, 3 r and k2 >r. 
Case a. We assume, w.l.o.g., that k, < r. Let 9; = .9r n 92 = {PI ,..., Pr} and 
PI = {P,, . , Pr?}. We further distinguish 2 subcases. 
Case a.1. k, # kl. Let ki = min{kt, kz} and kj = max{kt, kz}. Consider the five 
random variables: 
F = P,...Pk,-,, 
A = pk,+l . . pk,, 
B = Bi, 
C = pk,, 
D = Bj. 
Random variables A,B, C,D, F,S satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 6.1. Indeed, H(SI 
ABF) = 0 as the participants in A together with the participants in F are kj - 1 2 ki and 
so with the broadcast message B, they can recover the secret. Analogously, one can 
verify that H(SIBCF) = 0 and H(S(ACDF) = 0. Moreover, H(SIADF) = H(SIF) = 
H(S), as the participants in AF are kj - 1 and they are not sufficient to recover the 
secret with Bj. H(SIBF) = H(SIF) = H(S) as the ki - 1 shares of participants in F are 
not sufficient to get any information on S even after seeing Bi. Finally, H(SIACF) = 
H(SIF) = H(S) as there is no broadcast message in ACF. From Lemma 6.1, we have 
H(K) >H(BCIF) >3H(SIF) = 3H(S) and there is no ideal secret sharing scheme 
with broadcast message. 
Case a.2. k, = k2 = k. Since the two access structures are distinct and Y = t2, then 
there exists a participant Pj E 9, \S/l. The following random variables: 
F = P, . *. Pk-2Pj, 
A = Pk_,. 
B=B,, 
C =Pk, 
D = B2, 
together with S satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 6.1. 
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If r < t2, the following random variables: 
F = P, ‘. Pk_2Prz, 
A = Pk_,, 
B = B2, 
C = Pk, 
D = BI, 
together with S satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 6.1. 
Case b. Assume, for simplicity, that kl bk2 and that 9’p1\9’p2 = {PI,. . . , P,, _,}, 
91 n% = {Pr,--r+~,...,Pt,} and 9%\97 = {Pt,+~,...,Pt,+tz-r}. 
If k2 < t2, then the following random variables: 
F = PI . ..Pk.-rp~,-r+l . ..P.,-I~,,+I . ..Pt.+kz-r, 
A = Pt,+t:-,, 
B = B2, 
C = Pt,, 
D=B,, 
together with S satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 6.1 and thus there is no ideal secret 
sharing scheme for A. 
Otherwise, if k2 = t2, as the two structures are not compatible, we have kl < tl. 
Consider the following random variables: 
F = PI . ..Pk.-rPt,-r+l . ..pt.-~pt,+~ ...Pt,+,2-rr 
A = f’t,-r, 
B=B,, 
C = Pt,, 
D = B2 
together with S, satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 6.1 and thus there is no ideal secret 
sharing scheme for A. 
Hence, if di and “92 are not compatible, it is always possible to find five random 
variables F,A,B, C, D such that C = Pi, for some Pi E 81 n 9’2 and B = Bj, where 
j E { 1,2}, that satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 6.1. Moreover, our constructions do 
not depend on the particular Pi E 9, n 92. We conclude that, if di and ~2~ are 
not compatible, for all P E 91 n 92 there exist a broadcast message Bj, j = 1,2 
such that H(P) + H(Bj) >H(P Bj) >3H(S). The inequality H(P) + H(Bj) >3H(S) 
holds for any distribution on the secrets, in particular for the uniform one. Hence, we 
have that H(P’) + H(B:)>3 log IS’\, w h ere S’ is an uniform random variable defined 
on support(S) while P’ and B; are random variables induced by the scheme on the 
shares given to participant P and on the broadcast message Bj, respectively, when 
the secret is chosen in S’. Applying Theorem 3.2 we obtain that H(P) + H(B,) = 
H(P’)+H(BJ) 3 3 log IS’1 = 3 log ISI and, consequently, there is no ideal secret sharing 
scheme with broadcast message for A. 
We now consider the case t 3 3. If there exists a pair of access structures in A that 
are not compatible then, from the previous discussion there is no ideal secret sharing 
scheme with broadcast message for A. On the other hand, if the t access structures 
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are pairwise compatible, then from Theorem 5.6 there exists an ideal secret sharing 
scheme with broadcast message for A. 0 
The previous theorem proves a gap for the size of the shares of participants and of 
the broadcast message. Either there is an ideal scheme (and participants’ shares and 
secret have the same size) or the size of at least one of them is 50% bigger than the 
secret size. Thus, we have proved that there are families of access structures for which 
any corresponding secret sharing scheme with broadcast message must either give to 
some participant a share of size strictly bigger than the secret size, or the broadcast 
message has to have size strictly bigger than the secret size even though each access 
structure belonging to these families admits an ideal secret sharing scheme. 
Next corollary is a consequence of Theorem 6.2. 
Corollary 6.3. Let A = { dcl,,?, ), . , dc1,.p,)} be a family of t 3 2 distinct access 
structures. There exists an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message fbr 
Aifandonlyif9in9,=@,foralli#j. 
Proof. If 9i n Pj = 0, for all i # j, then the access structures d(i,:y, 1,. . . , SI’~~~,~,) 
are pairwise compatible. Thus, from Theorem 6.2 there exists an ideal secret sharing 
scheme with broadcast message for A. On the other hand, suppose that there exist two 
indices i and j, 1 ,< i < j < t such that Yi f? Pj # 8. Then &‘(i,?p,) and dci,:~,) are 
not compatible, as we suppose that the access structures in A are distinct. Hence, for 
Theorem 6.2, an ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for A does not 
exist and thus, the corollary is proved. q 
In some cases a better bound on the size of the shares distributed to the participants 
holds. Consider the set of participants B = {&,,Xi,&, . . . ,X,,} and the access structure 
JH, which is the closure of {{Xi ,X2,. . . , ~~},{~O~~I},~~O,~~>,...,{~O,~~-~}}. In a 
similar way of Theorem 4.1 in [5] one can easily prove that for any 12 - 2 indices 
zl,z2 ,..., in_2 E {1,2 ,..., n- l}, it holds that 
H(Xo) + H(X,) + ” + H(X+)3(2n - 3)log ISI. 
The following theorem holds. 
(1) 
Theorem 6.4. Let A = {d(k,,~,), d(k2,p2)}, with kl <k2, be a family of two distinct 
connected access structures. Let r = 19, n 9~1. 
If kl < r then 
1. If k, < kz, then for any PI,, . . , PI,_,, E 9’1 n 92 where t = min{kl,r}, it holds 
that H(BI) + C~~~‘H(P~,)3(2(t - kl) + l)log ISI. 
2. If kl = k2 = k and r = t2, then for any PI,, ,Pl, E 81 fl 92, where e = 
min{k - 1,ti - Y}, it holds that H(B,) + ,?$,H(P,,)>(2/ + 1)log ISI. 
3. If k, = k2 = k and r < t2, then for any PI,, . . . ,Pl, E 91 fl 93, where 6’ = 
min{k - l,tz - Y}, it holds that IT(&) + c;f=,H(Pl,)3(26 + 1)loglSI. 
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If r <kl, then 
1. For any PI,, . . , PI,_, E .Y, n 9’2, where t = min{r, t2 - k2 + I}, it holds that 
H(B2) + C;.I:H(P,I)>(2(t - 1) + l)loglS/. 
2. For any PI,, . . . , PI,_, E 9p1 n 92, where t = min{r, tl - kl + l}, it holds that 
H(BI) + C;.I:H(Pl,)>(2(t - 1) + I)log(SI. 
Proof. By using the same technique employed in Theorem 5.2 from a scheme C for 
A we can construct a new scheme Z’ by fixing the value of the shares given to some 
participants. This is equivalent to make “public” the shares of those participants. By 
F we will denote sets of participants whose shares will be made “public” to fuel the 
intuition of the reader. This enables us to use directly the lower bound (1). In this 
way, we reduce both the number of participants in the scheme and the threshold of 
the scheme. 
Suppose that kl < r, then we have 
Case 1: kl < k2. Let t = min{kz,r}, Xa = Bi, Xr_k,+2 = Bl, F = {Pi,,. ..,Pji,_,}U 
{P/,,...,P/i2_,}, where {Pi,,..., Pj,,_l}C91 n ~~\{PI,,...,P~,_~,+,}, and {f’f,,..., 
P/A2_,}c 9’pz\Yp1 (the latter set count0 only when k2 - t > 0), and, for i = 1,. . , t - 
kl + 1, let X, = PI,, with PI, E 91 n 9’2. It is easy to see that participants above satisfy 
the hypothesis of lower bound (1). 
Case 2: kl = k2 = k and r = t2. Let 1p = min{k - l,tl - r} (L + 1 <k < 
r), XO = BI, &+2 = B2, let F = {Pj, , . . . , P~~~,}C~P,\{PI,,...,PI,+,} such that 
{Pi ,,..., Pjl_,-,} C92, and for i = l,..., e + 1, let X, = PI<, with Pl, E 91 n 
92. It is easy to see that those participants satisfy the hypothesis of lower 
bound (1). 
Case 3: kl = k2 = k and r < t2. Let e = min{k - l,tZ - r}, X0 = B2, X(+2 = B,, 
let F = {Pi, ,... ,Pjkm,}C~2\{P~,, . . . . PL,} such that {Pj,,...,P/i~,_,}C~l, and, for 
i=l,..., C+l,letX,=PI,,withP,~EB,n~P2. 
It is easy to see that those participants satisfy the hypothesis of lower bound (1). 
On the other hand if r < kl, then let t = min{r, t2 - k2 + l}. Let X0 = B2, X,,, = B,, 
F = {P.F,,...,PsIz_,} U {Pjl,...,P,,,_I}, with {P,,,...,P~,,_,}C~2\{P,,,...,P,,} and 
{pj,,...,p,,,_,}C~l\~ 2, and, for i = 1,2 ,..., t, let Xi = PI,, with Plf E 9’1 nP2. It 
is easy to see that those participants satisfy the hypothesis of lower bound (1). The 
inequality H(B1) + ci:t H(PtI ) 2(2(t - 1) + 1) log IS/ can be proved in a similar way 
by changing the role of PI, tl, kl, and BI with 93, t2, k2, and B2 in the above proof. 
Thus, the theorem holds. Cl 
We now analyze the case in which the access structures in A consist of all possible 
distinct threshold structures on 9, that is, A = { dc~f 1 1 1 d k d 1.9” / < n and 9’ C 9). 
From Theorem 6.2 there is no ideal secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for 
A. The following algorithms describe a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message 
such that for all P in 9, H(P) = log ISI. We suppose that S = GF(q), where q 32nt 1 
is a prime power. 
Notice that we can always construct the threshold scheme (n + 1,2n) used in the 
Message-Generation algorithm. Indeed, we show how to realize an (n+ 1,2n) threshold 
scheme by using the threshold scheme proposed by Shamir [26]. We have to construct 
a polynomial f(x) over GF(q) of degree n such that f(i) = yL, for i = 1,2,. . . , n, and 
f(0) = s. This can be done by using Lagrange interpolation. Thus, we set yi = f(i), 
for i = n + 1,. . . ,2n. The broadcast message bk,y, that enables the access structure 
A?(~,YI) has entropy equal to H(Bk,?f) = (n - k + 1) log ISI. Moreover, the entropy of 
the share of each participant Pi E 9 is equal to H(Pi) = log ISI. Since each broadcast 
message bk,Yl consists of n -k + 1 values of f(x), every k participants in the threshold 
structure ~&‘ck,:vr) know n + 1 values of f(x) and can reconstruct the secret s. But k - 1, 
or less, participants are not able to recover the secret. 
It is clear that the previous algorithm can be easily adapted to handle the case 
in which only a subset of all threshold structures can be activated by the broadcast 
message. However, notice that we could use any ideal (n + 1,2n) threshold scheme in 
the Message-Generation algorithm, since in [15] it has been proved that in any ideal 
secret sharing scheme for any given access structure &, the share given to any X $! &‘, 
are uniformly distributed. 
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Threshold Preprocessing-Algorithm 
Input: S = GF(q), U,, and 9’ = {PI,. . . ,P,}. 
For all Pi E P, randomly select r; E GF(q) and set aj = ri. 
Output: The shares al,. . . ,a, for participants PI,. . . , P,,, respectively. 
Threshold Message-Generation 
Input: s E S = GF(q), al,. . . ,a,, k, and P’, such that 1 <k 6 19 I< n 
Use a (n + 1,2n) threshold scheme for the secret s to generate the shares 
yi ,..., yzn in such a way that y; = aj, for i= l,..., n. 
Compute 
bkp = ( I <i<~,_k+,‘~~+ii) ” ( ~~~‘a ‘)’ ,. 
Output: The broadcast message bk,.p/ that enables the access structure d&P). 
7. Fully dynamic secret sharing schemes 
In previous sections we have analyzed the situation in which we have various access 
structures and by using a public message we enable one of them to recover the secret. 
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A more interesting scenario arises when we want to activate different access structures 
at subsequent times. At time i we want to enable an access structure &y’, chosen in 
a fixed family A(‘), to recover the ith secret si. The family A(‘) of access structures 
that can be enabled at time i may depend on the access structures activated at previous 
times. If b!” . . . bit_,” are the broadcast messages sent by the dealer from time 1 up to 
time i - 1,‘ihen we should denote the family of access structures that can be enabled at 
time i by A;.::,,,,,_, but to avoid overburdening the notation we will denote this family 
simply by A(‘) when no ambiguity arises. 
Suppose that at time i the dealer enables the access structure ~4;:‘. Thus, after the 
publication of all i - 1 previous broadcast messages, any subset of participants in JG’~.:’ 
will recover the ith secret after seeing the ith broadcast message. Moreover, at time i 
each subset of participants knowing only the i - 1 previous broadcast messages have 
no information on the secret si. 
Suppose that we want to enable different access structures to reconstruct a secret 
a number of times, say T. Let SCi) be the set from which we choose the ith secret. 
We assume that the sample space of the secrets at time i depends neither on the 
previously broadcasted message nor on the access structure we want to activate at time 
family of possible access structures at time i, 
the set of participants involved at time i and let 
are the broadcast messages sent by the dealer from time 
1 up to time i - 1, then we should denote the family of all sets of broadcast messages 
for all possible access structures at time i by Bi{l,.,,j,_, , but to avoid overburdening the 
notation we will denote this family simply by B(‘) = {B\“, . ,BiI} 
A fully dynamic secret sharing scheme is defined as follows. 
Definition 7.1. A fully dynamic secret sharing scheme is a distribution of secrets in 
S(I), . . , SC’) among participants in 9” such that 
1. Before knowing the new broadcast message any subset of participants has no infor- 
mation about the new secret: Formally, for all X & 9, for all i = 1,. . . , T, and for 
all ji , . . . , ji-1, where 1 <j, d mr, it holds that H(S(‘)IXB(‘) . . .i$!I,“) = H(S(‘)). 
2. After all participants have received the new broadcast ‘message, we have a new 
secret sharing scheme: Formally, for all i = 1,. . . , T, for all X C 9, and for all 
jl,... , jl, where 1 <jr <rn/, it holds that 
H(S(‘)JXB(‘)...B(.‘)) = 1 H(S(‘)) if X $! ki’ Jl It 0 if X E 32~~‘: 
We could have defined fully dynamic secret sharing schemes as schemes in which 
after all participants have received the new broadcast message it holds that H(S(‘)\XB~~‘) 
= 0 if X E JZ$:‘, that is, at time i to reconstruct the secret it is enough to know only 
the broadcast message B::) enabling the access structure G!:‘. All the results presented 
in this section do not change under this different assumption. 
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As we have done in Section 3 for secret sharing schemes with broadcast message, 
we can represent a fully dynamic secret sharing scheme as a tuple. We can use the 
same technique employed to prove Theorem 3.2 to show that a scheme C, for the 
families of access structures A(‘) , . . . , A(‘) on the set of participants 9 with secrets 
chosen in St’ 1 , . . . ,ScT), is also a fully dynamic secret sharing scheme for the same 
families of access structures with secrets chosen in S’(I), . . , #CT), where S’(‘), . . , S’cr) 
are arbitrary random variables defined on support($‘)), support(S(T)). It is im- 
mediate to see that for any XC 9 it holds that H(X) = H(X’). Moreover, for any 
e E (l,...,T} and for any fixed broadcast messages in B;I) E B(l), . _. , Bz_1’) E 
B(‘-‘) the scheme C constitutes a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for 
A::,!,,,j,_, = {dy’, . . . > at’;)} for secrets chosen in S co. From Theorem 3.2, the scheme 
C is a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for any probability distribution 
on the support of S([). Thus, for i = 1,. . ,m/, it holds that H(Bir)) = H(B:j”), 
H(S’(/)IX’B;;‘) . ..Bi!/_T”) = H(S’(‘)), for all XC 9, H(S’(‘)IX’R:(‘). ..B;:‘_T”) = 0 
for X E G$:‘, and H(S’(‘)IXB:“. B:(/T’)) = H(S’(/)) for X E _G$:‘, where X’ and 
B;‘),..., B;:” are the random variables induced by .Z on the shares given to partici- 
pants in X and on the broadcast message, respectively, when the secrets are chosen in 
S’(l) $0 >..> . 
Therefore, we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 7.2. Let A(‘), . . . ,AcT), where A(‘) = {-c4’,“, _ _. , di,‘!}, be families of access 
structures on pi. If C is a fully dynamic secret sharing scheme for A(‘), . . . ,AcT) with 
secrets chosen in SC’) ,. ..,ScT), then C is a fully dynamic secret sharing scheme jbr 
A(‘),..., ACT) with secrets chosen in S/t’), . . . , S/CT), where S’(l), . . . , S/CT) are arbitrary 
random variables dejined on support(S(‘)), . . , support(S(T)). Moreover, jbr i = 
1,. . . , T and for any X C 9, it holds that H(X) = H(X’) and H(BjI’) = H(B;!‘)), 
where X’ is the random variable induced by C on the shares given to participants in 
X and BJ:” is the random variable induced by C on the broadcast message enabling 
the access structure AT$’ when the secrets are chosen in S’(‘), _ _ , S/CT). 
The following theorem is a generalization to fully dynamic secret sharing schemes 
of Theorem 4.2. We omit the proof since it is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2. 
Theorem 7.3. Let A(‘), . . ,AcT), where A(‘) = {d;ei”, . . , dab} be families of‘ access 
structures on a set 9 of participants. In any fully dynamic secret sharing scheme, 
for i = 1,2,...,T: 
1. For any P E 9(j), it holds that H(P) 3 log IS(’ 
2. For j = 1,2,. . , mi, it holds that H(By))> log /SC’)/. 
Definition 7.1 says nothing about sets X @ JZ$’ of participants who know all previ- 
ously recovered secrets s’, . . . , si- ‘. A natural requirement is that the information that 
those sets of participants have on the ith secret si given the secrets s’, . . . , Si- i, is equal 
C. Blundo et al. I Theoretical Computer Science 165 (1996j 407-440 431 
to zero. That is, the knowledge of previous secrets does not give information about the 
ith secret to all sets of participants not in ~2:‘. Next we define a strong fully dynamic 
secret sharing scheme, that is a fully dynamic secret sharing scheme with an additional 
property. 
Definition 7.4. Let A(‘) , . . . , ACT) be families of access structures on 9. A strong fully 
dynamic secret sharing scheme is a fully dynamic secret sharing scheme such that after 
all participants have received the new broadcast message, any subset of participants 
that is not in the new access structure, even knowing all the previous secrets, has no 
information about the new secret: 
Formally, for all i = 1,. . . , T, for all jl , . ,ji, where 1 <jr < rn/, and for all X $ 
.di”, it holds that 
Notice that the property H(S(‘)~XB~.~’ . . .E$‘S(‘). . .J!$-‘)) = H(S(‘)) in the above 
definition implies that H(S(‘)iXB$:’ . . . I?::‘) = H(S(‘)). 
For any ji, . . ,jj and any access structure &J::’ E Ax! ,,.,, /~, , let J&$)~, = {XU(BI:), , 
B~;-,“,B~~‘} 1 X E a~‘~~‘}, that is, &:{‘;, contains all the sets that can reconstruct 
the secret in the access structure ZZ?::’ together with the messages broadcasted up to 
time i - 1 and the broadcast message Bjf’ that enables this access structure. Intu- 
itively, in &‘.i)B ,,,,,j, the broadcast messages Bi:), . . ,L?~f~,‘),L$’ “play” the role of partic- 
ipants. 
The following lemma is a generalization of Lemma 4.1 to strong fully dynamic se- 
cret sharing schemes. We omit the proof since it is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.1. 
In the remainder of this section all results assume strong fully dynamic schemes. 
Lemma 7.5. Let A(‘) , . . . , A(‘) be families of access structures on a set 9 of partic- 
ipants. Let d’.‘) E A(‘), 
Jl 
ly y E p{B;;‘,... 
“‘i:“\di:!$ and X U Y E JZ$:):.,, then 
The following theorem proves a lower bound on the size of shares held by a fixed 
participant. 
Theorem 7.6. Let 9 be a set of participants and let A(‘), . . . ,A(‘) be families of 
access structures on 3’. If there exist T indices j,,.. .,jT, a participant P E g, and 
subsets of participants X, G 9, where i = 1,. . , T, such that 
l X, # JZ$‘, but X, U {P} E ~Zjf’, for i = 1,. . . , T. I 
l X,&Xi+l,for i= l,..., T- 1. 
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Then, in any strong fully dynamic secret sharing scheme for A(‘), . . . , AcTI the entropy 
of the shares given to participant P satisfies 
H(P) 2 5 log IS(i)/. 
i=l 
Proof. Consider the entropy H(P). We have 
H(P) 3 H(PIX~B~.~)) (from (A.4) of Appendix) 
= H(S(‘)) + H(PIXrB(‘)S(“) 
/I 
(from Lemma 7.5) 
> H(S(t)) + H(P\X~B~~‘L$‘S”‘) (from (A.5) of Appendix) 
= H(S”‘) + H(Sc2)) + H(PI~*B::‘B:I’S”‘S(‘)) (from Lemma 7.5) 
. . . . 
>,H(S(‘))+...+H(S(‘))+H(Pj,Y,B~~’...Bjlj’S”’...S”‘) 
3 H(S(‘)) + . . . + H(s(T)) + H(PIX# . . . Lp”’ . . . Lv) 
b H(S”‘) +. . . + H(S(r)) (from (A.2) of Appendix) 
The inequality H(P)>~~,H(S(‘)) holds for any distribution on the secrets, in par- 
ticular for the uniform one. Since any strong fully dynamic secret sharing scheme is 
also a fully dynamic secret sharing scheme, we can apply Theorem 7.2 which proves 
the theorem. 0 
We point out that Theorem 7.6 does not hold if we assume fully dynamic secret 
sharing schemes which are not strong. 
As an example consider the following situation. Let A(‘) = {&I”} and A(‘) = 
{&i”} be two families of access structures on the set of participants 9 = {PI, Pz, P3 >, 
where &‘\‘) = cI(((PrP2))) and J@) = cl(((P2P3))). Suppose that at time 1 the 
dealer enables d(1’) to reconstruct the secret s(‘) and at time 2 the dealer enables JZ!‘\~) 
to reconstruct the secret sc2). The following algorithms describe a fully dynamic secret 
sharing scheme for A(l) and At2) where both secrets are chosen uniformly in Z,, q > 2. 
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Preprocessing-Algorithm 
Input: Z,, U,, 9 = {P’,Pz,P3} and A(‘), Ac2). 
For i = 1,2,3, randomly select ri E Z, and set a, = r, to be the share of 
P, E 8. 
Output: The shares a’, a2, a3 for participants P' , P2, P3, respectively. 
Message-Generation 
Input: d’),d*) E Z,, A”‘, Ac2), and CI~,U~,LZ~. 
Compute 
h’,2’ = a2 + a3 + SC*’ mod q, 
and 
by’ = u2 + a3 + st2’ mod q, 
that are the broadcast messages for the two access structures J&‘\” and JzZ~), 
respectively. 
Output: The broadcast messages b’,” and 6i2). 
I 
The scheme above realizes a fully dynamic secret sharing scheme which is not 
strong. In fact, it is easy to see that 
H(S’2)(P,P3B(‘)B(12)S(‘)) = 0 I 2 but {P,P3} @ dj2’. 
The scheme above satisfies the remaining hypothesis of Theorem 7.6 by setting P = P2, 
X’ = (P’) and XI = {P’,P3}. On the other hand, we have H(P2) = H(S(‘)) = H(S(*)), 
thus 
H(P2) < H(S”)) + H(S(2’) = log jS(‘)\ + log jS’2’1 
The following corollaries to Theorem 7.6 hold. 
Corollary 7.7. Let 9 be a set of participants and let AC”, . ,AcT) be families of 
uccess structures on g such that G? (k,,,~,)~A(~),fori=1,2 ,..., T.Ij’k’<k2<...<kT 
und 9” & 23 C . . & PpT, then in any strong filly dynamic secret sharing scheme the 
entropy of the share given to any participant P E 9, satisfies 
H(P) 3 5 log IS(’ 
1=' 
Proof. Let P be a participant in 9’. Construct the sets X’, . . . ,xT as follows. Let 
X’ c 91 \{P} be a set of cardinality k’ - 1. For j = 2,3,. , T, the set X, consists of 
all participants in Xj-’ and kj - kj_’ participants in ?j\({P} Ux,_,). It is easy to see 
that the participant P and the sets X’, . . ,XT satisfy the hypothesis of Theorem 7.6, 
thus the corollary is proved. 0 
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Corollary 7.8. Let 9 be a set of n participants and let k and T be positive integers, 
with 1 <k<n and Tdn -k. Let A(‘) , , . . , AtT) be families of access structures on 9 
such that &(k,y/) E A(‘), Jbr e = 1,. . , T, where Y = 91 > 92 > . . . > .?pr, Igprj >k 
and (Yr( = jYPr-l ( - 1 for L = 2,. ., T. Then, in any strong fully dynamic secret 
sharing scheme for A(‘), . . . , ACT) the entropy of the share given to any participant 
P E PT satisjies 
H(P) 3 5 log IS(i 
i=l 
Proof. For any P E ppr consider a set A E &Fkdy j such that P E A. For i = 1,. . . , T, 
let Xi = A\(P). The corollary follows from Theorem 7.6. Cl 
A particular class of strong fully dynamic secret sharing schemes which satisfies 
the hypothesis of Corollary 7.8 are (k,n) threshold schemes with disenrollment [2]. 
At each subsequent time instant we disenroll a participant from the scheme, but the 
threshold of the new scheme remains unchanged. Thus, in any (k,n) threshold scheme 
with L-fold disenrollment capability (as defined in [2]), with 1 <L<n - k, for any 
participant P E Y, it holds that H(P) 2 cf=, log IS(i)l, obtaining a stronger version of 
the main theorem of [2] since Cf=, log IS(i)l >C~=,H(S”‘). 
8. Randomness in secret sharing schemes with broadcast 
Randomness plays an important role in several areas of theoretical computer science, 
most notably algorithm design, complexity and cryptography. Since random bits are a 
natural computational resource, the amount of randomness used in computation is an 
important issue in many applications. Therefore, considerable effort has been devoted 
both to reduce the number of random bits used by probabilistic algorithms (see for 
instance [ 191) and to analyze the amount of randomness required in order to achieve 
a given performance [23]. The Shannon entropy of the random source generating the 
random bits represents the most general and natural measure of randomness. The quan- 
titative study of the number of random bits needed by secret sharing schemes has been 
initiated in [7], where the optimality of several secret sharing schemes according to 
this measure has been proved. 
In this section we define the dealer’s randomness for secret sharing schemes with 
broadcast message. We present a lower bound on the dealer’s randomness BY(A,q) of 
any distribution protocol realizing a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message for 
a given family of access structures A = {&I , . . , d,,,} when the secret is chosen in 
a set of cardinality q. We recall that throughout this paper we assume that all secrets 
are chosen in the sample space with non-zero probability. 
To formally define the dealer’s randomness we use the Shannon entropy of the 
random variables generating the secret and the shares. The entropy is strictly related to 
the measure of randomness introduced by Knuth and Yao [21]. Let A be an algorithm 
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that generates the probability distribution P = (PI,. . . , p,), using only independent and 
unbiased random bits in input. Denote by T(A) the average number of random bits 
used by the algorithm A and let T(P) = minA T(A). Knuth and Yao proved that 
Theorem 8.1 (Knuth and Yao [21]). 
H(P)< T(P) < H(P) + 2. 
Thus, the entropy of a random source is very close to the average number of inde- 
pendent unbiased random bits necessary to simulate the source. 
To analyze the randomness needed by the dealer we define the dealer’s randomness 
of a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message C, when the probability distribution 
on the set of secrets S is &, as 
.%(A, II,, I) = H(P, . . .P,B, . . .B,JS). 
The value &!(A, ZIs, C) represents a lower bound on the amount of randomness required 
by the dealer to set up the scheme when using the scheme .Z and when I778 is the 
probability distribution on the secret. Notice that G?‘(&,fls,C) depends also on C 
since the probability that participants receive given shares depends both on {ps(s)},,s 
and C. 
Definition 8.2. Let A = { dl, . . . , d,} be a family of access structures on a set 9 = 
{PI,. . , P,,} of participants. The dealer’s randomness of A is defined as 
where Z! is the space of all probability distributions IIs = {p~(.s)}~~~ on the set of 
secrets such that for any s E S it results that ps(s) > 0 and 3 is the space of all 
secret sharing schemes with broadcast message C for the family A. 
We remark that the dealer’s randomness represents the minimum amount possible 
of randomness for a given family A of access structures when the secret can assume 
ISI values with non-zero probability. 
The definition of independent sequence given in [7] can be easily modified to handle 
the more general case of secret sharing schemes with broadcast message as follows. 
Definition 8.3. Let A = {&‘l, . . . , dm} be a family of access structures on a set 
g = {P, , . . . ,P,,} of participants. A sequence Pi, , . . . , Pj, of participants such that 
{4ji2...~pj,) 6 df f or some k E { 1,. . . , M} is called independent if for all i < r” a 
subset Xi C 9 {B,, 
{P,,,...,P,,Pj,+,}UXi E df. 
In a similar way to Theorem 2.1 in [7] we can prove the following theorem that 
represents our main tool to derive lower bounds on the the amount of randomness 
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required by the dealer to set up a secret sharing scheme with broadcast message. We 
repeat it here for the reader’s convenience. 
Theorem 8.4. Let A = {d, , . . . , dm} be a family of access structures on a set 9 = 
{PI,. . ,P,,} of participants. Supposing the secret is chosen in S, if there exists an 
independent sequence of length e then 
%‘(A, ISI)>Clog ISI. 
Proof. Let Pj,, , Pj, be an independent sequence of participants. We have that 
H(Pj, . ..Pj.) ~H(Pj~)+H(PjJPj~)+“‘+H(Pj,(Pjl~.~~~Pj,_~) 
(from (A.3) of Appendix) 
3 H(Pj, ) + H(Pi2 IP~,XI > + ’ ’ . + H(Pj, lP/, . . . Pj,_,x/- I) 
(from (A.5) of Appendix) 
3 /H(S) (from Lemma 4.1) 
Previous inequality holds for any probability distribution on the set of the secrets, in 
particular for the uniform one. Therefore, we have that H(PJ, . . P;, ) >H(S’) = log JSI, 
where S’ is an uniform random variable defined on support(S) and Pj,, . , PJ, are 
the random variables induced by the secret sharing scheme with broadcast message on 
the shares given to participants Pj, . Pj, when the secret is chosen in S’. From (A.3) 
and (A.2) (see Appendix) we get 
H(Pl Pz...PnBl . . B, IS) > H(Pj, . ..Pj. IS). 
Since {Pj ,)...) Pj,} $2 df, for some i E (1,. . . , m}, from Lemma 4.3 we have H(Pj, . . . 
Pj, ) = H(Pj, . . Pj, IS). From Theorem 3.2 we have that H(P,, . . . Pi,) = H(P:, . . . P:, ). 
Hence, for any secret sharing 
H(PIP2.. .P,B, . .&IS) 
scheme with broadcast message it holds that ” ’ 
2 H(Pj, . ..Pj. IS) 
= H(Pj, . ..Pj.) 
= H(P;, . ..P.,) 
2 flog p 
and the theorem follows. 0 
Next corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 8.4. 
Corollary 8.5. Let A = {&I,.. ., d,,,} be a family of access structures on a set 
9 = {P,,... , P,,} of participants. The dealer’s randomness B(A, ISI) satisjies, 
C. Blundo et al. I Theoretical Computer Science 165 (1996) 407-440 431 
PrOOf. Let X = {Pj, , P,, , . . , Pj,} be a minimal qualified set, that is X E &F and 
-02, E A, for some Y E { 1,2,. . , m}. The sequence of participants PI,, PI?, . . . , PI, is an 
independent sequence. Indeed, the sets Xi = {Pj,,:, . . , Pj,B,}, for i < I - 1, and the 
set X1-l = {B,} satisfy the properties of Definition 8.3. Thus, from Theorem 8.4 we 
have 9(A, IS()a 1x1 log ISI and the corollary holds. Cl 
For threshold schemes with broadcast message the following bound holds. 
Corollary 8.6. Let A = {JxZ~~,,~, ), . . . , d~k,,,,,~,,,)} be a jhmily of threshold access struc- 
tures on a set B = {P, , . . . , P,} of participants. The dealer’s randomness %!(A, ISI) 
satisjies 
+@(A, ISI)>, max{k,,. .,k,,,} log (SJ. 
The previous corollary proves that the protocol we presented in Section 6, to realize 
secret sharing schemes with broadcast message for the access structures in A consist- 
ing of all possible distinct threshold structures on 9, is optimal with respect to the 
randomness used to construct such schemes when (SI is a power of 2. 
We can improve on the lower bound provided by Corollary 8.6 when A consists 
only of two threshold access structures. 
Theorem 8.7. Let A = {dck,,.*, ), d~k2,cp2)} be a family of two threshold access struc- 
tures on a set 9 = {PI ,. . . ,P,} of participants. Let tl = (911, t2 = 1921, and 
r= 191 ng~21. Zfmax{tl -kl,tz-k2}2r, then 
WA, ISl>a(k, + k2)log IS/. 
Else, if tl - Y < k, and t2 - r < k2, then the dealer’s randomness 2(A, ISI) satisjies 
g(A, ISI>> max(k2 + tl - r,kl + t2 - r}log ISI. 
Proof. Suppose, w.l.o.g., that tl - r > k, . Then, the sequence of participants P,, , , 
P li,+kl, where P;l,.-.,P,k E 9’l\Yz and P,,,,, ...Pi,,+,2 E 9’2, is an independent 
sequence. Hence, B’(A,(bl)>(k, + k2)log ISJ. Now, suppose that tl - r < kl and 
tz - r < k2. The sequence of participants Pi,, , , Pi,?,,, _, , where Pi,, . _ . , P,,, _, E 9, \S,, 
P +,*,>-.-, pi,, l g, -_), E 9~ n 92 and P,,,++,+, , . .) Pi&?+,, _  E 9’1\9,, and the sequence 
of participants pi,, . , P,,, +,?_, where Pi,, . . . >Pi,,- E 92\%, P++, , . . , P,,*+,, _,, E 
91 n 92 and P1,~i-i,-,,+,,...IP,k,+,2_, E 9’1\9’2, ar; independent sequences. Therefore, 
B!(A,(SI)> max{kz +t~ -r,k, +t2 -r}log(SI. 0 
Since Y < tl and Y < t2, then max(k2 + tl - Y, kl + t2 - r} 3 max{kl, k2) and so above 
theorem improves on Corollary 8.6. 
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Appendix. Information theory background 
In this Appendix we review the basic concepts of Information Theory used in our 
definitions and proof. For a complete treatment of the subject the reader is advised to 
consult [14, 161. 
Given a probability distribution {~(x)}~~x on a set X, we define the entropy4 of 
X, H(X), as 
H(X) = - c P(X) 1% P(X). (A.1) 
XEX 
The entropy H(X) is a measure of the average uncertainty one has about which element 
of the set X has been chosen when the choices of the elements from X are made 
according to the probability distribution { ~(x)}~~x. The entropy enjoys the following 
property: 
O<H(X) d log 1x1, 
where H(X) = 0 if and only if there exists x0 E X such that p(x0) = 1; H(X) = log /XI 
if and only if p(x) = l//Xl, for all x E X. 
Given two sets X and Y and a joint probability distribution {p(x, y)}xE~,yE~ on their 
Cartesian product, the conditional entropy H(XJY), also called the equivocation of X 
given Y, is defined as 
H(XIY) = -~~~~~~p(r)p(xly)logp(nly). 
From the definition of conditional entropy it is easy to see that 
H(XlY)>O. (A.2) 
If we have nf 1 sets Xi,..., X,, Y, the entropy of Xi . . .X, given Y can be expressed 
as 
H(X~...X,IY)=H(X,IY)+H(X2IX~Y)+...+H(X,IX,...X,_,Y) 
The mutual information I(X; Y) between X and Y is defined by 
1(X; Y) = H(X) - H(XIY) = H(Y) - H(YIX) 
and enjoys the following properties: 
1(X; Y) = Z(Y;X), 
(A.3) 
4 All logarithms in this paper are to the base 2. 
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and 
from which one gets 
H(X)bH(XIY). (A.4) 
Given n+2 sets X,Y,Zr ,..., Z,, and a joint probability distribution on their Cartesian 
product, the conditional mutual information I(X; YlZt . . .Z,) between X and Y given 
21,. . , Z, can be written as 
Z(X; YIZ, . ..Z,) =H(X(Z, . ..Z.) - H(XIZ, . .Z,Y) 
=H(YJZ, . ..Z.)-H(YIZ ,... Z,X). 
Since the conditional mutual information is always non-negative we get 
HP I-5 . . .Z,)>H(XlZ, . . .Z,Y). (A.5) 
From (A.3) and (A.5) one easily gets that for any sets Y,Xt,.. .,X, and a joint prob- 
ability distribution on their Cartesian product it holds that 
~H(x,~Y)~H(~~x~...x,~Y). (A.61 
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